Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 83 | Issue 2

Article 8

1-1-2008

Your Opinion Really Does Not Matter: How the
Use of Referenda in Funding Public University
Student Groups Violates Constitutional Free
Speech Principles
Gregory B. Sanford

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
Gregory B. Sanford, Your Opinion Really Does Not Matter: How the Use of Referenda in Funding Public University Student Groups Violates
Constitutional Free Speech Principles, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 845 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol83/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

YOUR OPINION REALLY DOES NOT MATTER:
HOW THE USE OF REFERENDA IN FUNDING
PUBLIC UNIVERSITY STUDENT GROUPS
VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL
FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES
Gregory B. Sanford*
INTRODUCTION

The public university has long been a bastion of intellectual diversity and philosophical debate, regularly launching new trends and
schools of thought of lasting significance. Within the university, student groups play a significant role in shaping, directing, and taking
part in this intramural conversation.' At the same time, these organizations generate controversy, repeatedly spawning litigation over the
contents of their messages. 2 However, this disagreement demon*
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1 One early example of this in the United States, although at a private rather
than a public institution, was the Philomathean Society at the University of Pennsylvania. Founded in 1813, the purpose of the society was "the advancement of learning." Philomathean Society, University of Pennsylvania Archives, http://www.
archives.upenn.edu/histy/features/studtorg/philo/philo.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2008).
2 See, e.g.,
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
221 (2000) (suit over a university providing funds to groups whose messages the plaintiffs found objectionable); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 826-27 (1995) (suit over the denial of funding to a student organization on the
basis of its Christian editorial viewpoint); Rounds v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ.,
166 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (suit to prevent the distribution of funds to student groups with which the plaintiffs disagreed); Carroll v. Blinken, 42 F.3d 122, 125
(2d Cir. 1994) (same); Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany,
399 F. Supp. 2d 136, 137 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (student suit over the means of fund distribution by a university); Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 504 (Cal.
1993) (suit over a university's collection of funds and distribution of those funds to
student groups with which the plaintiffs disagreed); Good v. Associated Students of
the Univ. of Wash., 542 P.2d 762, 764 (Wash. 1975) (same).
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strates that universities create a thoughtful diversity of opinion by welcoming all voices.
Student groups must have money to survive. Schools often
require students, as part of their tuition bill, to contribute a certain
amount per semester to a pool of money to be divided among the
student organizations. 3 These funds help organizations convey their
messages to the university population through speakers, lectures, rallies, or flyers. However, because groups must compete against each
other for a limited pool of money, some inevitably do not receive
enough funding for everything they would like to do. In response,
universities developed various procedures to distribute these funds
fairly and efficiently among organizations. The most common example is the funding committee. 4 This committee is commonly part of
the university's student government body and staffed by elected student leaders. 5 Each group that wants funding must submit a request
to the committee 6 which, based on the information contained in the
7
applications, allocates the available funds.
The student referendum is another, far more controversial technique used to determine how much funding to allocate to specific
student organizations. Referenda are not ubiquitous funding tools
among public universities, but a number use them to apportion at
least part of the pool of funds to student groups. Universities use referenda in several ways within their allocation process: to determine
whether an organization should be eligible for funding, 8 to determine
how much money an organization should receive, 9 to gauge student
3 The State University of New York at Albany (SUNY-Albany), for example, funds
its student organizations through this sort of mandatory fee. See Amidon, 399 F. Supp.
2d at 138; State Univ. of N.Y., Student Activity Fees-Mandatory, http://www.suny.
edu/sunypp/documents.cfm?docid=358 (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
4 One example of this particular technique is the one used at the Ohio State
University. Its allocating body is the Council on Student Affairs. For details on this
committee and its procedures, see Ohio State Univ. Student Affairs, Procedures,
http://studentaffairs.osu.edu/csa-procedures.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2008); see also
STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY STUDENT Ass'N CONST. art. IV (describing the SUNYAlbany Student Association's board of finance); STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. STUDENT ASS'N
BYLAws §§ 507, 509 (State Univ. of N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter SUNY STUDENT ASS'N
BYLAWS] (describing the Appropriation Committee's hearing procedures and the process of funding new groups).
5 See, e.g., STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY STUDENT Ass'N CONST. art. IV, § 2.
6 E.g., Ohio State Univ. Student Affairs, supra note 4.
7 See, e.g., id.
8 E.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000).
9 E.g., Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 399 F. Supp.
2d 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
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body interest in particular organizations,1 0 and to see whether students want to provide an organization with voluntary contributions 1
or a refundable allocation. 12 Each option has advantages, such as
being in accord with the will of the student body and providing efficiency for both student groups seeking funds and student governments distributing them.
In public university settings, student group funding must comply
with the First Amendment. 13 Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, a public university may not consider a student organization's
14
viewpoint in making fund allocation decisions affecting that group.
Referenda violate this principle because they entwine student views
and the popularity of the speaker into the mandatory fund allocation
process. As a result, using referenda to allocate mandatory student
activity funds is unconstitutional.
This Note illuminates the unconstitutionality of the referendum
as an allocation device. Part I explains the principle of viewpoint neutrality and how the Supreme Court has applied that standard in the
student organization funding arena. Part II discusses the six general
types of referenda along with specific implementations and demonstrates why each is fundamentally flawed and impermissible. Ultimately this Note concludes that because universities cannot use
referenda in a way that both protects students' First Amendment
rights and gives due consideration to student organizations' contributions to campus speech, they should eliminate referenda from the
funding process.
I.

SOUTHWORTI-H, VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY, AND THE THREAT

OF VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION

An examination of the Supreme Court's approach in Board of

Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth 15 and the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality more generally reveals why the use of ref-

erenda in public university student organization funding is
unconstitutional. Subpart A provides an overview of Southworth. Sub10

E.g., id. at 139.

11

See, e.g., UNIV. SENATE

GUIDELINES REGARDING SPECIAL STUDENT

ORGS.

§ 11(2)

[hereinafter RUTGERS UNIV. SENATE GUIDELINES] (Rutgers Univ. Senate 1997), available at http://senate.rutgers.edu/referend.html.
12 In this context, each student must pay into the allocation to the group at issue,
but can then elect to request a refund from the school or the organization. See, e.g.,
id. § 11(1).
13 See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 221.
14 Id.
15 529 U.S. 217.

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

83:2

part B briefly examines the nature of the viewpoint neutrality doctrine. Finally, subpart C touches on the benefits of viewpoint
neutrality in making student group funding choices.
A.

The Standard

The Supreme Court held in Southworth that the First Amendment
rights of public university students require that all distributions of
16
mandatory fees to student organizations must be viewpoint-neutral.
In Southworth, the Court considered the challenge of a group of University of Wisconsin students to mandatory fees used to fund student
organizations at their school. 17 The plaintiffs contended that the University violated their First Amendment rights by using mandatory fees
to fund student organizations whose messages the students found
objectionable and offensive'S-in essence, they claimed, making the
organizations' speech attributable to each individual student.1 9 Thus,
the plaintiffs asserted that the school forced its students to say things
they found objectionable. 20 The Supreme Court upheld the University's funding system but imposed a viewpoint neutrality requirement. 2 1 This provides objecting students "some First Amendment

protection" 22 by ensuring that all groups have access to available funds
without regard to their message. 23 Although a student may disagree
with the speech of some groups that receive mandatory fees, other
groups with which a student agrees would also have equal opportunities to obtain funds. At the same time, this standard allows universities
16 Id. at 221.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 227.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 232-33. The Sejenth Circuit applied the "germaneness" test of Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977), and Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990), to the University's funding system. Southworth v.
Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000). The germaneness test considers
"whether there is some otherwise legitimate governmental interest justifying any compelled funding; and then whether the specifically challenged expenditure is germane
to that interest." Id. at 724. One commentator has argued that the Supreme Court
did not actually reject the germaneness test of Abood and Keller as it claimed, but
rather merely took a more inclusive approach to germaneness than the Seventh Circuit. See Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77
TUL. L. REv. 163, 216-17 (2002).
22 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231.
23 Id. at 233.
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enough flexibility to "facilitate a wide range of speech," 24 and to provide students "the means to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects in their
25
extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall."

During its analysis, the Court briefly took up the question of the
University of Wisconsin's referendum procedure. 26 It noted that the
procedure appeared to have the potential to "fund[] or defund[]"
student organizations.2 7 While the Court did not decide the constitutionality of referenda in general or even of this referendum procedure specifically, 28 the majority noted that any use of referenda must
comply with the requirement of viewpoint neutrality.2 9 Specifically,
the opinion stated that "[t]o the extent the referendum substitutes
majority determinationsfor viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the
constitutional protection the program requires. '30 These observations, however, do not resolve the question of whether the referendum in Southworth or those at other public institutions of higher
31
learning are in fact, or could possibly be, viewpoint-neutral.
24
25

Id. at 231.
Id. at 233.

26 See id. at 235-36. Interestingly, although significant scholarly discussion of the
Southworth opinion has emerged in the years following the decision, the referendum
question has received virtually no attention. Many of the law review articles discussing
the case mention that there was a referendum procedure and that the Court questioned its constitutionality and a few provide a cursory discussion. See, e.g., Randall P.
Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IowA L. REv.
1377, 1425 n.192 (2001);Jon G. Furlow, The Price of FreeSpeech: Regents v. Southworth,
73 Wis. LAw.,June 2000, at 14, 58; Wasserman, supra note 21, at 214; R. Craig Wood &
Alvin J. Schilling, The Judicial Dilemma Created by Mandatory Student Activity Fees: The
Supreme Court Offers a Resolution in Ruling in Wisconsin v. Southworth, 147 EDUC. L.
REp. 413, 428 (2000). None, however, take the next step of analyzing the wider implications of the viewpoint neutrality standard on student organization funding referenda. The reason for this could be an absence of cases challenging a referendum
procedure under the Southworth guidelines prior to Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State
University of New York at Albany, 399 F. Supp. 2d 136 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
27 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
28 See id. at 235-36.
29 See id. at 235.
30 Id. (emphasis added).
31 Some commentators on the Southworth case have read the language regarding
the referendum procedure to be a declaration that it was unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Aaron H. Caplan, Stretching the Equal Access Act Beyond Equal Access, 27 SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 273, 366-67 (2003); Christine Theroux, Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandatory
Student Activity Fee Systems: All Students Benefit, 33 CONN. L. Rv. 691, 713 n.181 (2001);
see also Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent School
District, 90 Ky. L.J. 1, 30 (2002) (reading a quotation from Southworth in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304-05 (2000), as declaring the referen-
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The Contours of Viewpoint Neutrality

Southworth declared that mandatory student activity funds are a
close analog to "public forum" cases. 32 The prototypical public fora
are "'public places' historically associated with the free exercise of
expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks."3 3 Like the
traditional public forum, the university uses student activity fees to
"facilitat[e] the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its
students." 34 Hence, the Court imported a tool-viewpoint neutrality-from that context as a means of evaluating whether students' First
35
Amendment interests had been respected.
Viewpoint neutrality is the absence of viewpoint discrimination.
Viewpoint discrimination occurs when any consideration-favorable
or unfavorable-of a speaker's viewpoint influences a funding decision. 36 Two related public forum doctrine concepts-content neutrality and content discrimination-further illuminate viewpoint
37
neutrality.
A government restriction of speech is content-neutral if it does
not limit what a speaker may say but restricts their speech in some
other way.3 8 Examples include limitations on the "time, place, and
manner" of speech, such as a noise ordinance. 39 Conversely, a speech
restriction becomes unconstitutional content discrimination when it
restricts the subjects a speaker may address. 40 One example is a ban on
all political advertising on public transportation. 4 1 It is not easy to
dum to be unconstitutional). However, the Supreme Court specifically stated that
because it had received an insufficiently developed factual record on the nature of
the referendum procedure it would remand the case for further consideration. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235-36. On remand, the University voluntarily eliminated the referendum procedure prior to adjudication on the merits. Fry v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 132 F. Supp. 2d 744, 746 (W.D. Wis. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Southworth v. Bd.of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566 (7th Cir.
2002).
32 See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229-30.
33 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
34 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
35 See id. at 230.
36 Cf Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29
(1995) (discussing how the government violates the First Amendment through viewpoint discrimination).
37 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 519 (2007).
38 See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 388 (2d
ed. 2005).
39 See id.; RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT § 6, at 107 (2003).
40 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29.
41 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974).
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provide a bright-line distinction between content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech because viewpoint discrimination is
a subset of content discrimination; 42 however, the Supreme Court has
said that viewpoint discrimination occurs when "the government...
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he
espouses on an otherwise includible subject." 43 For example, a public
school engages in viewpoint discrimination when it generally allows
the use of its facilities for clubs but denies access to religious clubs. 44
While there are no bright-line rules to determine whether the
government is "restrict[ing] some viewpoints while leaving others
unrestricted," 45 the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of University of Virginia46 further illustrates the nature of viewpoint discrimination. In Rosenberger,the University of Virginia denied
funding to a student newspaper because of its Christian editorial viewpoint. 4 7 The University argued that this constituted a content-based

restriction because it excluded both religious and antireligious
views. 48 Pointing out that debate, including religious debate, is not
bipolar, the Court found the University's policy to be impermissible
viewpoint discrimination because it excluded some viewpoints on
religion and not others. 49 Thus, Rosenbergersays that when mandatory
student fees are involved, a university may not engage in viewpoint
discrimination even if it may impose general content-based restrictions. 50 At the same time, the Court demonstrated that it is willing to
look beyond assertions that restrictions are content-based to find that
the restriction actually discriminates based on viewpoint. 5'
C.

The Benefits of Viewpoint Neutrality

Why is viewpoint discrimination in handing out money to student
organizations at public universities so odious? To have truly "dynamic
42 Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 830-31 ("[D]iscrimination against one set of views or
ideas is but a subset or particular instance of the more general phenomenon of content discrimination."). For example, the content discriminatory regulation in Lehman
did not engage in viewpoint discrimination. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304. However,
were Lehman's regulation to forbid Green Party advertising it would be discriminating
on both content (political speech) and viewpoint (Green Party advocacy).
43 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
44 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107-12 (2001).
45 VOLOKH, supra note 38, at 389.
46 515 U.S. 819.
47 Id. at 827.
48 Id. at 831-32.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 829-30.
51 See id. at 830-32.
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discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political
subjects ... outside the lecture hall,"5 2 the exchange must represent
the full marketplace of ideas. Viewpoint-based restrictions narrow discussion within the forum. They have been referred to as "attempt[s]
to control thoughts . . . by regulating speech," 53 means "to suppress
unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate
through coercion rather than persuasion," 54 and a tool to "distort the
marketplace of ideas." 55 Censorship, regardless of the motivation,
indisputably narrows the scope of discussions.
A narrow discussion cannot create the dynamic environment universities claim to be their ideal. The most restrictive type of discussion
narrowing would be silence for all sides within a particular arena of
debate. This content-based restriction provides no room for anyone
to convince others of the correctness of his point of view, leaving the
status quo in place and placing an additional burden on minority
viewpoints. 56 Preventing all speech does not promote dynamic discussion because it permits no discussion at all.
A viewpoint-based restriction limits discussion in an almost identical way. Unlike a content-based restriction, this type of limitation
does not silence all speech, rather it burdens the viewpoint it
excludes. In effect, because some speech is absent, the remaining
debate flows in favor of the contrary positions. 57 Moreover, if the goal
of the forum is "discussion[]" of any sort, 58 the removal of viewpoints
59
results in less discussion, which is contrary to the forum's goal.
Rationalizations for such discrimination fail on their merits. For
example, one could argue that concerns for a speaker's safety justify a
52

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233

(2000).
53 Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199, 203 (1994).
54 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
55 Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 204.
56 See Helgi Walker, Communications Media and the First Amendment: A ViewpointNeutral FCC Is Not Too Much to Ask For, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 5, 9 (2000); see also R.
George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of
a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 343 (2006) ("[O]ne cannot say that
viewpoint-based prohibitions are generally worse than prohibitions of any discussion,
from any perspective, of an entire topic. In some meaningful respects, the former
may be better .... ").
57 See Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 203.
58 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233

(2000).
59 The regulation forbidding political advertising on public transportation from
Lehman is an example of a regulation that is content discrimination but not viewpoint
discrimination. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974).
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restriction on his speech. 60 A violent response to speech is certainly
undesirable, but paternalistic protection of a speaker is not a valid
First Amendment reason to restrict speech. 6 ' Moreover, there is
arguably significant benefit in moral and intellectual conflict. 62 The
failure of these rationalizations argues against viewpoint-based
restrictions.
Dynamic, vibrant discussions among student organizations in a
university context require a viewpoint-neutral funding standard. Contrary policies shape discussion against those who are unpopular at any
moment and generally stifle intellectual interaction. 6 3 These concerns permeate Southworth's imposition of viewpoint neutrality on the
funding of student organizations.
Having established this analytical baseline, this Note evaluates the
generic classes of funding referenda. This evaluation will consider
both the constitutionality of those systems in light of Southworth,64 and
the practical value of and possible difficulties in instituting such
systems.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL

FLAws

IN THE Six ARCHETYPICAL

FUNDING REFERENDUM MODELS

There are six general variations on how public universities use
funding referenda. This Part will discuss each type of referendum
and its constitutional and practical infirmities. Subpart A discusses
binding referenda-referenda where the student vote makes a conclusive determination of whether a group will receive funds. Subpart B
explores the constitutionality of using referendum results as one factor among many in the funding decisions. Subpart C considers two
uses of referenda disconnected from the mandatory fee at issue in
Southworth: the refundable fee and the optional fee. Finally, Subpart
D discusses generic referendum procedures that lack specific controls
on their use within the funding context.
60

Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of
CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 341 (1997).

Speech, 15
61

Id.

62 SeeJeremy Waidron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, 35 POL. STUD. 410,
414-17 (1987) (discussing the benefits of the concept of "ethical confrontation"
presented in John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty).
63 See generally Nadine Strossen, Civil Liberties, 4 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 253,
267 (1994) (discussing the dangers of governmental censorship of speech).
64

(2000).

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
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Binding Referenda

The binding referendum is, conceptually, the simplest type of
funding referendum. Similar to how the American democratic process employs referenda, 6 5 the binding referendum allows a vote of the
student body to serve as the final decisionmaker in the student organization funding process. 66 There are two general ways public universities have used binding referenda: to determine whether groups are
eligible for funding, 67 and to determine how much funding to allocate to a group. 68 Both approaches violate students' First Amendment
rights by engaging in viewpoint discrimination.
1. Binding Referenda Used to Determine Funding Eligibility
Given the Court's guidance in Southworth, the binding referendum that can be used to "fund[] or defund[]" a student organization
is most plainly unconstitutional. 69 This type of referendum puts a
question to the student body as to whether a particular group should
be eligible to receive funding from the university's mandatory student
activity fee. 70 It thus fails the viewpoint neutrality test and defeats the
primary purpose of the forum by narrowing the range of participating
71
speech.
The Supreme Court confronted precisely this type of referendum
in Southworth-where "by majority vote of the student body a given
[student organization could] be funded or defunded. ' 72 Without
deciding the procedure's constitutionality, the Court strongly ques65 One example of this general referendum was the 2006 referendum vote to
amend Michigan's constitution to bar affirmative action in public education, employment, or contracting. Tamar Lewin, Michigan Rejects Affirmative Action, and Backers Sue,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P16.
66 See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231 ("[B]y majority vote of the student body a given
RSO may be funded or defunded.").
67 See infra text accompanying notes 69-83.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 84-106.
69 See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235-36.
70 Id. at 235.
71 See id. at 231.
72 Id. The presence of this procedure at the University of Wisconsin was not
unique. A similar procedure was (arguably) available at SUNY-Albany prior to a
rewriting of the SA's Constitution and Bylaws. See Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the
State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 399 F. Supp. 2d 136, 148 n.10 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). In both
cases, there were alternate routes to funding (which may or may not have been viewpoint-neutral) but at least one group made use of the referenda process to obtain its
funding. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 224; Amidon, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
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tioned whether it could withstand constitutional scrutiny. 73 Further, it
provided guidance on how to determine the referendum's constitutionality: "To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional
protection the program requires." 7 4 The strong reservations
expressed by the Court about this procedure reflect the significant
constitutional arguments against this referendum.
"Access to a public forum... does not depend upon majoritarian
76
consent. 7 5 A referendum is by definition a majoritarian device,
and, even though "the student activities fund is not a public forum in
78
77
the traditional sense of the term," it is closely analogous thereto.
Therefore, as the Court in Southworth suspected, the use of a binding
referendum to fund or defund student organizations must be unconstitutional. 79 As one commentator noted, "Since the point of viewpoint neutrality [is] to provide First Amendment protection to
objecting students, it is easy to understand why a referendum allowing
voting on funding is suspect. Minority viewpoints could, through
funding restrictions, be swept away at the voting booth by majority
rule."8 0
A simple hypothetical derived from Rosenbergerdemonstrates the
incompatibility of viewpoint neutrality with majority votes. Suppose
that after the Supreme Court's decision invalidating the restriction on
religious speech,8 1 the University of Virginia removed its prohibition
on religious editorial viewpoints and separately instituted a binding
student referendum to determine whether organizations should
receive funding. It would then follow that the student body could
73

See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235-36; see also supra note 31 (discussing some con-

fusion among commentators on the significance of the Court's statements regarding
the referendum).
74 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
75 Id.

76 Some universities do not require a majority vote in their referenda, requiring
either a supermajority, as was previously the case at SUNY-Albany, or some submajority percentage, as is used at Rutgers. See STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY STUDENT ASW'N CONST. OF 2003 § 705.1 (b) (superseded); RUTGERS UNIV. SENATE
GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § II(1) (B). Regardless of the percentage used, the result is
the importation of the speech's popularity into a process that must be viewpointneutral.
77 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 230.
78 Id. at 229-30.
79 Id. at 235.
80 Furlow, supra note 26, at 58; see also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 ("Access to a
public forum .. .does not depend upon majoritarian consent.").
81 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995).
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effectively reinstitute the prohibited restriction by voting against funding for organizations with religious viewpoints-discriminating based
on viewpoint. Even if the students did not reinstitute the viewpointbased prohibition, the referendum still faces the insurmountable
problem that it can never practically prevent students from casting
their vote based solely on a group's message.
Fundamentally, a referendum system that allows funding or
defunding of organizations based exclusively on a referendum vote
cannot meet the viewpoint neutrality requirement of Southworth.8 2 Its

majoritarian approach to distributing mandatory fees provides no
First Amendment protection to objecting students. 8 3 Though this
might have been a viable option for public universities prior to Southworth, that decision clearly demonstrates that such a referendum violates students' constitutional rights.
2.

Binding Referenda to Determine Level of Funding

The second form of binding referendum determines the level of
funding a group receives but cannot prevent an organization from
receiving funding. By definition, there must be at least one alternate
funding procedure employed along with this form of referendum to
ensure that a student body vote cannot be the sole basis of a complete
denial of funding to a particular organization. 84 Another essential
element of this type of referendum procedure is that it allocates funds
from the same mandatory fee pool as those distributed by any alternative procedures. In spite of these differences, this form of referendum
is as decidedly unconstitutional as using a referendum to fund or
defund student organizations.
This type of referendum was in use at the State University of New
York at Albany (SUNY-Albany) prior to changes in the SUNY-Albany
Student Association (SA) Bylaws and New York state statutes.8 5 The
effect of the old regulation is still visible in the SA's bylaws, which
require that "all designated funds... be brought up in a referendum
82 See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 221.
83 Id. at 235-36.
84 An example of this sort of alternate procedure is the funding committee. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
85 See Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 399 F. Supp.
2d 136, 137 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); STATE UNIV. Or N.Y. AT ALBANY STUDENT Ass'N
CONST. oF 2003 §§ 705, 816 (superseded); see also N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 8,
§ 302.14(c) (1) (i) (changing the referenda within the SUNY system to advisory only);
STATE UNrV. OF N.Y. STUDENT ASS'N BYLAWs § 517 (State Univ. of N.Y. 2003) (implementing the change from binding referenda to advisory only).
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at least every four (4) years."8 6 These "designated funds" are the

budgets of specific student organizations, which were allocated
through binding referenda.8 7 Before the advisory referendum
change, the vote was "binding upon a sixty percent affirmative vote of
votes cast."8' 8 The only difference between this system and the University of Wisconsin's is that the student vote cannot make an organization ineligible for funding, though the student may vote to "fund" the
organization with no money. This variation from a referendum used
to completely fund or defund organizations is minute, but its defenders claim that it is significant enough to make this form of referendum
constitutional. 89 Theyjustify this claim by arguing that Southworth was
only concerned with access to money and the amount allocated is not
subject to constitutional restriction. 90
Despite these claims, this sort of referendum also fails to protect
students' First Amendment rights. Funding is not a binary proposition; the Southworth Court intended viewpoint neutrality to protect
groups from discrimination in how much funding they received, not
just in their ability to receive any funds at all. Second, the potentially
viewpoint-neutral justification offered in defense of this system is an
invalid interpretation of the referendum's results.
The Court specifically held that viewpoint neutrality is the operative First Amendment protection in the "allocation of funding support."9 1 "Allocation" can mean several things, but in this case, it goes
beyond mere access to encompass the level of funding received by an
organization.9 2 If "allocation" means only access to the process, the
Court's decision does not provide meaningful protection to students'
86 SUNY STUDENT Ass'N BYLAws, supra note 4, § 515.3 (on file with author).
Details on how organizations could get their budgets onto the ballot can be found at
id. § 517.4.
87 One example, NYPIRG, is written directly into this provision. Id. § 515.3.
88 STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY STUDENT ASS'N CONST. OF 2003 § 705.1(b)
(superseded).
89 Southworth FAQs-The Center for Campus Free Speech, http://www.campus
speech.org/resources/southworth-faqs (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Southworth FAQs].

90

Id.

91 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233
(2000).
92 The district court in Amidon also understood this to be the nature of the forum
at issue:

The fact that the referendum is used to consider the amount of funding
as opposed to whether to fund or defund a group does not save it.... As
majoritarian views are not to be considered in determining entrance into a

public forum, neither can they be used for considering the scope of a participants' activity therein.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:2

First Amendment rights. The importance of viewpoint neutrality in
determining the amount of funding cannot be understated. The
93
power of a group's speech is tied directly to the funds it receives.
Funding is, in essence, a megaphone: the more a group receives, the
larger its megaphone. 9 4 When the amount of a group's allocation is
not protected, the majority cannot silence an unpopular viewpoint,
but the referendum can reduce a group's message to a mere whisper
and stifle the diverse forum that justifies the mandatory fee. 95 This

would defeat Southworth's attempt to craft a standard that allows a university to "facilitate a wide range of speech." 9 6 The correct definition
of "allocation" therefore must include the amount of funding
received by an organization.
This definition of "allocation" renders the binding referendum to
determine the level of funding unconstitutional. If a referendum
determines a group's funding, a majority could muffle a group's
speech by providing only a minimum amount of funding. Alternatively, because the student activity fee pool is finite, 9 7 allocating funds
to some groups by referendum reduces the overall resource pool available to other groups. Since referenda are viewpoint-based tools and
affect all allocations, whether through the referendum or not, this
funding system is neither viewpoint-neutral nor constitutional.
One oft-repeated argument in favor of this type of referendum is
that it is a measure of student participation rather than viewpointbased favoritism; 98 however, the results of this referendum cannot
accurately gauge participation, and, even if they could, they would still
constitute a viewpoint-based decision. 99 A system that uses participation as a measure to allocate funding will necessarily amplify popular
Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 399 F. Supp. 2d 136, 150
(N.D.N.Y. 2005).
93 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (discussing the neces-

sity of money for effective communication).
94 See id. (explaining how almost every communication tool requires a monetary
expenditure).
95 See Amidon, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (finding that the use of a referendum to
determine the amount of funding an organization receives "is akin to allowing citizens to express their views on how long a particular group's parade should be, or how
many leaflets a particular group should be allowed to distribute," which is constitu-

tionally unacceptable).
96 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231.
97 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995)
(noting that the University was making arguments based on the scarcity of funds for
student organizations).
98 See, e.g.,
id.; Southworth FAQs, supra note 89.
99 Amidon, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
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viewpoints at the expense of unpopular ones, because popular viewpoints attract more participants than unpopular ones. 0 0 Thus,
although it is possible to objectively measure participation, its implications are inherently viewpoint-based. I0 1 This view falsely assumes that
those who vote in favor of a particular allocation are going to participate in that group's activities.' 0 2 First, a more accurate gauge of those
involved in a student group-the group's membership rolls and participation records-is readily available. Second, referendum questions in the funding context ask whether a group should receive a
certain level of funding, not whether a student will participate in its
activities. 10 3 Finally, even if the question asked if the student would
participate, a student's vote does not guarantee action consistent with
that vote, making this count unreliable. Thus, the referendum fails to
supply the information attributed to it. Even when based on accurate
information, participation and viewpoint are tied inextricably
together. 10 4 Thus, because participation is not a viewpoint-neutral
factor, its use is constitutionally deficient under Southworth.
Referenda that grant or deny funding to organizations are unconstitutional. Referenda that determine how much funding a group
receives are also unconstitutional. Both allocate funds in a way that
reflects the popularity of an organization's viewpoint. Because Southworth requires that these decisions be viewpoint-neutral, these systems
are unconstitutional.10 5 Moreover, these referenda reduce the overall
diversity of discussion while increasing the influence of the most pop100 For a discussion of factors that provide advantages to currently and historically
popular viewpoints, see Southworth v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 307 F.3d 566, 593-95 (7th Cir. 2002).
101 See id. at 594-95 (discussing how levels of student participation may sometimes
be considered but may also be indicators of the popularity of speech and thus not
viewpoint-neutral).
102 Amidon, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
103 The disconnect from rates of participation is apparent from a question proposed for use at SUNY-Albany:
Do you wish to support a chapter of the Collegiate Action Leadership
League of New York at $5.00 per semester creating a viewpoint neutral vehicle for the avocation [sic] of affordable and accessible higher education,
preserving the environment, protecting the rights of all citizens, and promoting a free enterprise economy on campus?
Brief for Appellant New York Public Interest Research Group at 17, Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 508 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 056623). The trial judge explicitly recognized this disconnect and rejected the related
arguments. Amidon, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
104 See Amidon, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
105 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221
(2000).
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ular views. Because universities institute these funding systems to
"facilitat[e] the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its
students," 10 6 using referenda to allocate funds defeats the very purpose for which the forum was created. Thus, allowing referenda to
play a controlling role in funding is not appropriate at any level.
B.

Influencing FundingLevel Through Advisory Referenda

Advisory referendum procedures are also constitutionally unacceptable. There, a resource-allocating body considers the results of a
student vote in concert with other factors to evaluate the merits of an
organization's funding request. 10 7 The decisionmaker is not required
to follow the results of the referendum, but may consider them within
the framework established by the university. Constitutionally, this referendum procedure is no kinder to students' First Amendment rights
than are binding referenda I1 because it introduces a viewpoint-based
factor into a decision that constitutionally must be viewpointneutral. 109
SUNY-Albany implemented this form of referendum in 2005.110
There, final funding decisions on all organizations' funding requests
are made by the Student Association (SA) Senate.1 11 The SA's bylaws
require decisions to be viewpoint-neutral. 1 12 The advisory referendum policy allows the SA Senate to "use advisory referenda . . . to

11 3
garner student input with respect to particular funding decisions,"
but forbids the SA from using the results to "determine whether a
group will or will not be funded."'1 4 The SA Senate has other criteria

106

Id. at 229.

107 For some examples of these factors, see SUNY STUDENT ASS'N BYLAWS, supra
note 4, § 517.5.
108 See supra Part II.A.
109 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 221.
110 As discussed, prior to 2005, SUNY-Albany's referendum process did in fact
make binding funding allocations. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
111 For a more detailed explanation of how the funding application process works
at SUNY-Albany, see Brief for Appellee at 2-3, Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State
Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 508 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05-6623).
112 SUNY STUDENT Ass'N BYLAws, supranote 4, § 513.1; see also id. § 513.2 (providing the working definition of "viewpoint neutrality").
113 Id. § 517.1.
114 Id.
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with which to evaluate organizations' requests," 5 but is not given any
standard for weighing the referendum results against them. 16
Advisory referenda are different from binding ones because their
results are not the only factor in funding allocations.' 1 7 By
decoupling the process from direct majoritarian controls, viewpoint is
only one factor among many in the decisionmaking process.' 1 8 The
student body is unable to withdraw funding from unpopular messages
by referendum vote and cannot directly reduce the allocable pool by
substantially committing funds to popular messages. Regardless, this
advisory procedure provides inadequate protection for students' First
Amendment rights.
As Southworth established, a university's process must allocate
mandatory student activity funds among student organizations in a
viewpoint-neutral manner." 9 The allocation method described above
utilizes a balancing approach considering multiple factors. 120 In
order to achieve a constitutional allocation, all of the factors considered must be viewpoint-neutral.' 21 The results of a referendum, however, represent the opinion of the student body. Because the
university cannot control the basis of students' votes, it must assume
that they will vote based on an organization's viewpoint. The referendum's viewpoint neutrality cannot be guaranteed. Whether a referendum question is phrased in terms of "value provided," "student
interest," or any other subjective measure, the result inevitably is a
reflection of the viewpoint of the speaker. Therefore, using the
results of a referendum introduces a viewpoint-based factor into the
allocation process.
115 Prior to the litigation in Amidon, these additional funding criteria were unwritten but have since been incorporated into the SA's bylaws. Amidon v. Student Ass'n
of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 399 F. Supp. 2d 136, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
116 SUNY STUDENT ASS'N BYLAws, supra note 4, § 517.1.
117 Advisory referenda are complementary to other decisionmaking factors. In
order to consider the referenda's effects in isolation, this discussion assumes that any
other factors considered are viewpoint-neutral. This assumption allows an isolated
consideration of the advisory referendum's effect. If this is not the case, the other
factors present separate constitutional problems outside the scope of this Note.
118 See Amidon, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 150; Brief for Appellant New York Public Interest Research Group at 32-33, Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at
Albany, 508 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05-6623).
119 See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233
(2000) ("[Tlhe principal standard of protection for objecting students . . . is the
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support.").
120 See supra text accompanying notes 110-16.
121 For more discussion of content- and viewpoint-based restrictions, see supra text
accompanying notes 38-51.
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Once the university introduces a single viewpoint-based factor
into its funding process, and regardless of the eventual funding decision, it irrevocably compromises the viewpoint neutrality of the system. As Southworth explained, "To the extent the referendum
substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would
1 22
undermine the constitutional protection the program requires."
When making a decision, the introduction of a viewpoint-based factor
means that the final decision is based on viewpoint and thus is constitutionally defective. If the viewpoint-based referendum results have
any influence (no matter how small) on the outcome, then the organization's viewpoint affected its allocation and the decision violates students' First Amendment rights. As the Supreme Court explained,
"' [F] undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections,' [referenda] are insufficient safeguards
of diverse student speech." 123 The advisory nature of the referendum
tries to address the concerns articulated in Southworth124 but cannot
keep the result of the decision viewpoint-neutral. Thus, as soon as
(and to the extent that) the decisionmaker considers the results of a
referendum in how the final funding decision is made the process
becomes unconstitutionally viewpoint-based. The fact that advisory
referenda result in viewpoint-based decisions makes them
unconstitutional.
C. Referenda Decoupledfrom the Mandatory-Fee System
Given the problematic nature of combining mandatory student
activity fees and any kind of student referendum, schools might move
in a different direction to create a constitutional system. The surest
route to constitutional compliance is to stop distributing money to
student organizations. A second, less drastic option is to eliminate the
use of referenda, so long as the remaining or replacement program is
viewpoint-neutral.
The question raised by this Note, however, is whether there is any
way to use referenda within a program of funding student organizations while still adhering to Southworth. The target of the change,
therefore, must be the mandatory nature of the contribution by students. In Southworth, the Court left open the possibility that a university might implement an optional or refund system to protect
122 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
123 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
124 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
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students' First Amendment rights. 125 However, upon further examination, it is hardly certain that either of these systems would survive
the Court's scrutiny when actually implemented and paired with a referendum. 126 Moreover, both create significant risks that some groups
will be underfunded. 27 Thus, even if these systems could be constitutionally implemented, it would almost certainly be best for universities
to simply forgo referenda in fund allocation altogether.
1. Refundable Fee Referenda
Southworth suggests that a refund system may be constitutional in
funding student groups.1 28 However, when used in conjunction with
a referendum, it is highly questionable whether it would remain So.129
This form of referendum determines how much to allocate to a particular group, but unlike the systems previously discussed, students then
have the option to request and obtain a refund of their portion of the
allocated funds. The refundable amount could be an allocation from
the standard student activity fee or a fee in addition to what each student is already paying.
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, offers this procedure
to its student organizations.1 3 0 Its system begins when a student
organization petitions the University Senate for a recommendation to
the President. 131 When the organization receives the necessary
approval, the University holds a referendum which requires an affirmative vote from at least twenty-five percent of eligible voters plus one
for passage. 1 32 If a question passes, the fee is
listed as a separate item on the term bill for payment by those students attending the division(s). A form to request a refund shall be
included along with the term bill, which shall be sent [by] the indi125 Id. at 232. Although the Court presented these optional systems as viable constitutional alternatives, it did so outside of the referendum context in which we consider it here. Id.
126 Note also that the decision's comments in this regard were dicta as they played
no role in the eventual judgment requiring viewpoint neutrality and the Court chose
not to impose them as a constitutional requirement. See id.
127 Justice Kennedy was hardly unaware of this risk in writing the Southworth opinion and took the time to point out that such a system could "be so disruptive and
expensive that the program to support extracurricular speech would be ineffective."
Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. Note that this comment in Southworth was made in the context of the whole
funding system and not the referendum specifically.
130 RUTGERS UNIV. SENATE GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § 11(1).
131 Id. § II(1)(A).
132 Id. § II(1)(B).
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vidual student to the organization. After verifying with the University that the student has actually paid the fee, the organization shall
133
send a full refund to the student.
This procedure also imposes requirements on the organizations such
as defraying the administrative costs associated with the referendum
and refund.1 3 4 Furthermore, an organization's budget must be
approved by referendum at least every three years in order to con35
tinue to be eligible for this refundable fee.'
Ultimately, while this system has fewer constitutional problems
than a mandatory fee system, it still violates students' First Amendment rights. Its primary constitutional advantage is that after the viewpoint-based decision is made through the referendum, students may
avoid having their money used for purposes they find offensive. But
insurmountable constitutional obstacles remain.
Two Supreme Court cases that are particularly relevant to this
sort of referendum concerned refundable union dues put to impermissible purposes. 136 In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 1 3 7 the Court rejected the "pure rebate approach," finding it

constitutionally inadequate.1 3 8 The Union's procedure offered
refunds of expenditures for "ideological causes not germane to its
duties as collective-bargaining agent." 39 The Court had previously
133 Id.§II(1)(C).
134 Id.§II(1)(D).
135 Id. § II(1)(E).
136 The relevance of union dues to the present context is rooted in Southworth.
There, the lower courts partially rested their decisions on the reasoning of Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), which also serves as a starting point for
some of the cases that will be discussed in this section. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 227 (2000). Though rejecting Abood's rationale, the Supreme Court recognized that the rights at issue in both cases were the
same. Id. at 230. The cases discussed in this section deal not with the issue of germaneness, which was rejected in the university context in Southworth, id., but with
refund systems for impermissibly collected funds, and thus are instructive in this
discussion.
137 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
138 See id. at 443. In this case, the Court interpreted 45 U.S.C. § 152, as allowing a
"union and an employer to require all employees. . . to join the union as a condition
of continued employment." Id. at 438. "In Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961),
the Court held that 'the Act does not authorize a union to spend an objecting
employee's money to support political causes.'" Ellis, 466 U.S. at 438 (quoting Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961)). Again, despite the slightly
different factual background, the constitutional violation was the same as that in
Southworth.
139 Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447 (describing the constitutional limits on collecting funds
from dissenting employees in Abood).
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held in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education140 that a union could not
constitutionally finance such expenditures with mandatory fees from
dissenting employees.' 4 1 In Ellis, the Union's use of the "pure rebate"
procedure resulted in the return of the exact amount of the objector's
dues allocated for the improper purpose.' 42 The Court found this
clearly inadequate. 14 3 As implemented, this refund system constituted
an "involuntary loan for purposes to which the [individual]
objects."'1 44 Given the abundance of "readily available alternatives,"
the "rebate scheme reduce[d] but [did] not eliminate the statutory
violation."145

Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson"4 6 expanded the Court's explanation of constitutionally problematic elements of refund systems in
the context of union dues.14 7 There the Court found three constitutional defects: objectors' contributions might be temporarily used for
impermissible purposes; the Union had provided inadequate information about the basis of the refund calculation; and arbitration of the
refund was not provided with reasonable promptness. 48 Even once
the Union had "created an escrow of 100% of the contributions
exacted from the respondents" to prevent the funds from being used
for impermissible purposes, the Court still found it insufficient
because it failed to remedy the second and third constitutional
flaws. 149 Citing contemporary commentary with approval, the Court
noted "'first amendment due process cases have shown that first
amendment rights are fragile and can be destroyed by insensitive
15 0

procedures."'
Ellis' and Hudson's concerns are implicated in this case because a
referendum is indisputably a viewpoint-based mechanism. Thus, since
the referendum is still being used, any refund procedure must be con140 431 U.S. 209.
141 Id. at 237.
142 See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 444.
143 Id. at 443.
144 Id. at 444.
145 Id. Although this quote frames the issue in statutory terms, shortly before the
Court had noted that it had not previously "pass[ed] on the statutory or constitutional
adequacy" of the pure rebate approach but that it now was finding this technique
"inadequate." Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
146 475 U.S. 292 (1985).
147 See id. at 294.
148 Id. at 304-07.
149 Id. at 309.
150 Id. at 303 n.12 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "DueProcess, "83
HARv. L. REv. 518, 551 (1970)).
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stitutionally adequate in order to obviate the constitutional offense
inherent in the referendum.
First, the refund must be available in practice. With the short
length of a university semester, the possibility exists that though theoretically offered to students, the time frame for a refund request
makes an actual refund all but impossible. If this were to occur, then
the procedure would not be a refundable procedure at all, but the
program would have ventured back into the unconstitutional realm of
151
the binding referendum.
Second, the amount of money returned to students affects the
constitutionality of the referendum. 152 Initially, as Hudson makes
clear, the students must have sufficient information to determine that
their refund actually reflects their pro rata share of the objectionable
subsidy.'5 3 Generally, given the nature of the forum and the procedure, determination of the amount spent on an objectionable activity
is simple: the student need simply look at the referendum question or
a tuition bill. 154 Rutgers does not require the exact amount of funding be included in the ballot question, 155 but it does require the fee to
be included as a separate item on each student's tuition bill. 156 However, if the bill's layout obfuscated the amount of each individual student's contribution, that would violate Hudson's requirements of
sufficient information on the offensive allocation and arbitration on
157
the refund amount.
Additionally, the collection of student money pending a request
for refund implicates the Ellis requirement of paying interest on those
funds. 15 In Ellis the Supreme Court made clear that without interest
159
on the amount initially paid, a refund system is unconstitutional.
The Court also held, however, that return of interest alone was not
sufficient to remedy the refund's constitutional harm. 60 Thus, when
a university employs a refundable fee system, it must return to students the amount initially paid plus appropriate interest. Though for
151 See supra text accompanying notes 65-106.
152 Although only a small amount of money is at stake for each student, the
Supreme Court has made clear the amount at stake for an individual does not diminish the importance of his constitutional rights. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 305.
153 Id. at 306.
154 For an example of this sort of question, in the advisory referenda context, see

supra note 103.
155
156
157
158
159
160

supra note 11, § IV(D).
Id. § II(1)(C).
See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306-07.
Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444 (1984).
Id. at 442, 444.
Id. at 444.
RUTGERS UNIV. SENATE GUIDELINES,
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each student this will likely be a miniscule sum,' 6 1 the school is not

162
relieved of its duty to remedy the damages caused by of this loan.
A third constitutional blemish on this system is the use of the
contributed money between initial payment and completion of the
refund. If the money is available for the purposes to which the student objects, the university has instituted a compulsory loan which the
Supreme Court has clearly held to be unconstitutional. 163 The process at Rutgers distributes collected money to organizations which
1 64
then process refund requests and return the money to students.
This is precisely the constitutional violation identified by the Court in
Ellis.16 5 In rejecting this temporary loan, the Court noted the plethora of constitutionally superior and readily available alternatives, such
as an advance reduction of the fee. 166 The Court also mentioned the
use of interest-bearing escrow accounts in a way that implies their constitutional acceptability. 1 67 However, the justifications for an escrow
option in the union context do not transfer to the university context:
the union scenario involves a single fee used for multiple purposes,
some permissible and some impermissible (and thus refundable). 168
In the context of a university such as Rutgers, on the other hand, the
refundable fee is fully separate from other mandatory (and constitutional) fees. As a result, the use of an escrow account constitutes an
involuntary loan that, even if not available for impermissible purposes,
is still unjustifiable in light of the readily available alternative of an
advance reduction.
Finally, even if a constitutional referendum-and-refund procedure were possible, several practical issues would eliminate its value in
advancing the cause of diverse speech on campus. First, because of

161 A university is probably unlikely to use anything other than a secure, lowreturn investment device; therefore, the interest returned to students will be very
small.
162 See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 305 (stating that "[t]he amount at stake for each individual dissenter does not diminish" concerns about subsidization of speech to which
the individual objects).
163 See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 444.

164 RUTGERS UNIV. SENATE GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § II(1) (C).
165 Ellis, 466 U.S. at 444.
166 Id.
167 Id. Following Ellis and Hudson a circuit split developed among the courts of
appeals on whether advance reduction of dues was the only constitutional alternative
in the union context. Most circuits find both escrow accounts and advance reduction
constitutional. See, e.g., Andrews v. Educ. Ass'n of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 339 (2d Cir.
1987). The Sixth-Circuit, on the other hand, requires advance reduction of dues. See
Tierney v. City of Toledo, 824 F.2d 1497, 1504-05 (6th Cir. 1987).
168 Ellis, 466 U.S. at 439-40.
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the brevity of semesters, timing is a major problem. Organizations
need access to the funds, but would not be able to use them while
awaiting refund requests. Since students need sufficient time to
request a refund, groups utilizing this procedure will be unfunded for
a substantial portion of each semester. Second, without widespread
and consistent use, an escrow program is likely to be cost-prohibitive.
If the university made a student organization bear that cost, it would
drain the organization's funding and further reduce the effectiveness
of its services. These concerns demonstrate that groups funded
through a referendum-initiated refundable fee would not contribute
to a university's goal of diversity of speech and active discussion and
debate of issues.
Despite the language of Southworth,169 it is clear from the Court's
other decisions that the use of a referendum to institute a refundable
fee to bankroll student organizations is unconstitutional. The fact
that students can request a refund implicates a different set of constitutional protections than those attendant to binding and advisory referenda, but these issues cannot be addressed through a refund
procedure. The constitutional requirements that a school return the
fee with interest and that it not use it for impermissible purposes
places this system on shaky ground. Further, because such a viewpoint-based system can be implemented more easily through an
advance reduction in a student's payment, a refund system has no
constitutional justification.
2.

Referenda and Optional Fees
The optional payment scheme mentioned in Southworth170 is

another step away from the problems of other referenda but remains
constitutionally problematic. Like a refund-based system, this procedure utilizes a referendum to allocate resources. 171 Unlike the
refund-based system a student may simply opt not to contribute in the
first instance. 172 Rutgers also offers this referendum option to its student organizations.1 73 As in Rutgers' refund-based system,1
169

74

to gain

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232

(2000).

170 Id. ("If a university decided that its students' First Amendment interests were
better protected by some type of optional or refund system it would be free to [implement such a system].").
171 See supra Part II.C.1.
172 See, e.g., RUTGERS UNIV. SENATE GUIDELINES, supranote 11, § 11 (2) (implementing this type of optional payment system).
173 Id. § 11(2).
174 See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
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access to the optional payment referendum, an organization must

receive the recommendation of and approval from the University Senate and President. 175 Similarly, the guidelines require an organization
to obtain affirmative votes from at least twenty-five percent plus one of
the eligible voters. 176 After an affirmative vote, the organization is
listed on students' bills with a notice that the payment need not be
77
made and with notice of a right to a refund if the fee is paid.'
By premising this system on voluntary payment, the most significant constitutional clash is avoided. Regardless of the viewpoint-based
nature of the referendum's decision, no student need contribute to a
cause he finds offensive or objectionable. In a sense, this is a mere
plea for donations by an organization. 178 The student has not made a
"loan" to the organization, so there can be no temporary misuse of the
funds. 179 Moreover, because there is no up front payment, there is no
question about how much must be returned' 8 0 or whether the funds
were allocated in a viewpoint-neutral manner. 18 1 From a practical
perspective, no administrative expenditures are required to deal with
refund requests and organizations' budgets are determinable earlier
in a semester.
In spite of all of these advantages, constitutional concerns still
linger with respect to this system. They stem from the fact that the
referendum is a viewpoint-based device, although Southworth's concerns about forum access being limited by vote have less force because
in this situation the contributions are not compulsory. 8 2 Initially, the
issue of practical availability raises potential systemic defects: if it is not
practically possible to opt out of the payment, then Southworth's concerns about majority rule return to the fore. This may occur if the fee
that the student may decline to pay is combined with amounts that the
student must pay so that students have no practical way to discern
what must be paid and what might not. The same problem would
arise if there were so many individual line items on a student's bill that
the optional ones were not readily identifiable or if the items were not
175 RUTGERS UNIV. SENATE GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § 11(2) (A).
176 Id. § II(2)(B).
177 Id. § II(2)(C).
178 The obvious difference between this and standard pleas for funding is that in
this case, the "plea" is officially sanctioned by the university and even potentially
added as a line item to the student's tuition bill. See, e.g., id. § 11(2) (C).
179 See supra text accompanying notes 163-69.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 152-62
181 See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
182 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235

(2000).
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clearly marked as nonmandatory fees. For universities trying to
increase funding to organizations, there would be incentives to construct a system to induce students to make the optional payment. The
system at Rutgers attempts to assuage these concerns by mandating
that the optional status of the payment be clearly marked,18 3 but as
part of a larger bill students still face the risk that this "clear" marking
will not provide sufficient notice of their right to opt-out.
Hudson and Ellis offer another perspective from which to analyze
this funding methodology. In both of these cases the Court noted
that an optional payment system would be a feasible option, explicitly
approving of such a procedure in the union context.1 8 4 But any university funding program must also meet the requirements articulated
by the Court in those cases. Specifically, under Hudson's reasoning, a
university would be required to provide sufficient information to students about how it is allocating their payments. 185 "Basic considerations of fairness, as well as concern for the First Amendment rights at
stake,... dictate that the potential objectors be given sufficient infor-

mation to gauge the propriety" of student fees.1 8 6 There must be
enough transparency in the funding process for students to be able to
see that the optional payment represents the totality of funding
directed to the objectionable organization based on the referendum.
Apart from constitutional issues, this system also contains a substantial practical risk of underfunding. Like the refund, lack of student participation is a concern. Without some sort of compulsion, the
only encouragement students have toward contributing is their own
passion for the message. Conversely, if a student is directly opposed
to the message-or is simply ambivalent and miserly-they are more
likely to opt out of this contribution opportunity. Since students are
generally strapped for cash, it is unlikely that they would voluntarily
contribute to many groups using this system. Thus, unless an organization is wildly popular within a campus community, they face substantial risk of being underfunded.
RUTGERS UNIV. SENATE GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § II(2)(C).
184 See Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306-07 (1985) (discussing
how the union's advance reduction procedure was constitutionally flawed because
insufficient information was provided to objectors regarding nature of fund expenditure); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444 (1984) (noting the
advance reduction of dues as an acceptable alternative to the union's dues refund
system); see also Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118-24 (1963) (discussing the plaintiffs' right to relief from the union's dues system).
185 Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306-07.
186 Id. at 306.
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In light of these constitutional and practical problems, a university must question whether it can preserve the necessary First Amendment protections for its students when offering an optional payment
system. Even if a school were to afford appropriate constitutional protections, it would be putting the "wide range of speech" it desires in
the forum at risk of contraction through lack of student participation.1 8 7 Although the First Amendment does not require all groups
receive unlimited funding, public institutions put student organizations' speech (and their First Amendment rights) at risk of insufficient funding with this sort of referendum.
D. Ambiguous Referendum Procedures
Ambiguously defined referendum procedures and referenda
used by public universities to make nonallocative decisions present a
further risk to students' First Amendment rights. For example, SUNYAlbany uses referenda to determine whether the student activity fee
will be mandatory or voluntary. 188 The University of North Carolina
uses referenda to set the amount of student activity fees.' 8 9 However,
many institutions, such as the University of Nevada, have open-ended

referendum procedures that allow "[a]ny item of enactment [to] be
put to a vote of the student."19 0 Other schools have similarly ambiguous definitions of permissible referenda use.19 1 This open-endedness
allows the use of the referendum to influence the funding of student
organizations. Using a referendum in this way is inevitably viewpointbased, 92 and as has been noted, the constitutionality of a student
187 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231
(2000).
188 Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 399 F. Supp. 2d
136, 138 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
LAWS OF THE STUDENT Gov'T OF THE UNIV. OF N.C. AT
tit. I, art. I, § 4(A) (2007), available at http://congress.unc.edu/code/
Title%20I.pdf.
190 CONST. OF THE ASSOCIATED STUDENTS OF THE UNIV. OF NEv. art. V, § 2(a), avail-

189

CODE OF PERMANENT

CHAPEL HILL

able at https://asun.unr.edu/Docs/OrganizationalDocument/ASUNConstitution2007.pdf.
191 See, e.g., ASSOCIATED STUDENTS UNIV, OF IDAHO CONST. art. X, available at
http://www.asui.uidaho.edu/userFiles/File/ASUIConstitution.pdf (placing no limits
on the permissible subjects for referenda); CONST. & BYLAWS OF THE UNIV. OF R.I.
STUDENT SENATE art. VII, pt. 12, available at http://www.uri.edu/student-organizations/senate/files/amendedbylaws2.03.doc (enabling the use of referenda to allow
students to vote on any issue); UNIV. OF VT. STUDENT GOV'T ASS'N CONST. art. VIII,

available at http://www.uvm.edu/-sgaclubs/constitution.php (allowing students to
use referenda to bypass the student senate and vote directly on an issue).
192 See supra text accompanying note 79.
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organization funding system hinges on its viewpoint neutrality. 19 3 As
such, a student vote to influence allocation of funds would immediately compromise the program's validity.
Compounding this threat to students' First Amendment rights is
the number of different places the referendum might be situated
within the funding process. Because there are no restrictions on the
procedure, any of the unconstitutional applications described in this
Part might come into play.1 94 Furthermore, without defined limitations, a creatively drafted referendum question might be able to hide
its importation of viewpoint-based considerations into the funding
process. Regardless of whether the constitutional deficiency is obvious or cloaked, the use of a referendum to influence student organi19 5
zation funding decisions is unconstitutional.
This type of referendum "system" does necessarily affect student
organization funding but students can use it for that purpose-making this tool at best a dormant threat. If no policies are in place to
restrain its unconstitutional application, students' First Amendment
rights are continuously at risk. In this sort of system, a university must
add explicit definitional language to exclude the potential for
majoritarian determinations in student organization funding. If it
does not, the risks to students' rights are at least as substantial as in
any of the systems with explicit referendum-based funding procedures. Given the large number of institutions that allow this sort of
ambiguous referendum, 196 this category may present the most widespread threat to students' rights.
CONCLUSION

The use of referenda in funding student organizations at public
universities is flagrantly unconstitutional. Eliminating the distribution
of funds to student organizations through mandatory and voluntary
contributions does not correct the constitutional problems. Universities have an interest in preserving students' ability to "engage in
dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and
political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall." I9 7 The solution is to proscribe any use of referenda in allocating funding to student organizations. This includes both
193 Bd. of Regents of the
(2000).
194 See supra Part II.A-C.
195 Southworth, 529 U.S. at
196 See supra note 191 and
197 Southworth, 529 U.S. at

Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221

221.

accompanying text.
233.

2oo8]

YOUR OPINION

REALLY

DOES

NOT MATTER

eliminating referendum procedures specifically designed to allocate
funding and limiting open-ended referendum procedures to prevent
misuse.
This approach does not harm either the university or the student
groups. Each university that implemented one of the referendumbased funding devices discussed in Part II also provided an alternative,
non-referendum-based procedure to student organizations seeking
funding.1 9 8 Furthermore, Southworth's questions about the constitutionality of referendum-based funding' 99 make it particularly improbable that a university would base its funding entirely on referenda.
Since universities do not depend heavily on referenda to fund student
groups and have alternative procedures available, abandoning constitutionally dubious and duplicative funding methodologies in no way
impairs the flow of funds to student organizations. 200 It would, however, remove the constitutional offenses discussed in this Note.
The purpose of funding student organizations is to foster "vibrant
campus debate among students."' 20 1 For a university to set a goal of
lively discussion and then trample the First Amendment rights of its
students is self-contradictory. If universities are serious about creating
vibrant intellectual conversation through student organizations and if
they are to comply with the Supreme Court's mandates from Southworth, they must eliminate the use of referenda in influencing funding
allocations.

198 See id. at 224; Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 399
F. Supp. 2d 136, 138-39 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); CONST. OF THE RUTGERS UNIV. STUDENT
ASSEMBLY art. V, availableat http://www.rcgaallocations.rutgers.edu/documents/constitution.pdf; University of Nevada, 2006-2007 Funding Policies, ASUN Clubs and
Organizations Board, http://asun.unr.edu/Docs/Form/C%20&%200%2OFunding
%20Request%202006.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
199 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
200 See Amidon, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 151.
201 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234.
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